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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WILLIAM R. CLYDE, \ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( 
vs. ) 
W. R. EDDINGTON, 





The parties herein will sometimes be designated in this 
brief as follows: Plaintiff and respondent, William R. 
Clyde, as "respondent" or "Clyde;" defendant and appellant, 
W. R. Eddington, as "appellant" or "Eddington;" Edding-
ton Canning Company, a corporation, as "Company." Ref-
erence to the record will be designated as "R." References 
to appellant's brief will be designated "A.B." 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff and respondent, William R. Clyde, was aP-
proached by a representative of Eddington Canning Com-
pany on or about March 6, 1957, with regard to entering 
into GOntracts with Eddington Canning Company, a corpora-
tion, under which Clyde would agree to sell farm produce 
to be grown during 1957 to the Company. At that time 
Clyde stated that due to the poor financial reputation of 
the Company he would not be willing to sell the produce 
to the Company unless he received a letter from W. R. 
Eddington personally guaranteeing payments under the 
contracts (R. 41). On March 6, 1957, Eddington executed 
and delivered to Clyde the following letter : 
"EDDINGTON CANNING COMPANY, INC. 
Phone HUnter 9-5611 




March 6, 1957 
This is to certify that I, personally, will guaran-
tee you payment for any tomatoes you raise and de-
liver for us, or any other crop contracted for, on the 
day contract specifies for payment. 
WRE/n" 
Yours very truly, 
EDDINGTON CANNING COMPANY 
/s/ W. R. Eddington 
W. R. Eddington 
(Emphasis added.) 
(R. 34, 41, 44.) 
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Relying upon said letter Clyde entered into a "Canning 
Pea Contract" and a "Packers and Growers Official Tomato 
Contract" with the Company on March 8, 1957 (R. 34, 36, 
37, 42). Pursuant to said contracts Clyde sold and delivered 
to Eddington Canning Company produce having a value of 
$2,028.62, no part of which has. ever been paid (R. 34, 42). 
Clyde would never have entered into the contracts nor de-
livered the produce to the Company if he had not received 
the letter from Eddington (R. 42). 
Clyde brought action on November 10, 1958, praying 
for judgment against both the Company and Eddington 
personally for the value of the produce (R. 10). The trial 
court granted Clyde's motions for summary judgment 
against both the Company and Eddington and denied 
Eddington's motion for summary judgment (R. 46, 48, 50, 
52, 54). The Company, which is insolvent, has not appealed. 
The judgments were based upon the pleadings, admissions 
(R. 28), stipulation as to facts. (R. 34) and affidavits filed 
by both the appellant (R. 39) and the respondent (R. 41). 
There is little or no dispute as to the facts in this case and 
the only question before this Court as noted on pages 3 and 
4 of the appellant's brief is whether the trial court erred in 
holding that Eddington was personally bound by the letter 
agreement as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE LANGUAGE IN THE GUARANTEE EXE-
CUTED BY EDDINGTON CLEARLY SHOWS 
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4 
THAT HE INTENDED TO BIND HIMSELF 
PERSONALLY. 
POINT II 
EDDINGTON'S PERSONAL LIABILITY IS NOT 
CHANGED BECAUSE OF THE FORM OF SIG-
NATURE ON THE GUARANTEE. 
POINT III 
EDDINGTON CANNOT RESORT TO PAROL 
EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT HIS INTENT 
WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT MANIFESTED 
BY THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LANGUAGE IN THE GUARANTEE EXE-
CUTED BY EDDINGTON CLEARLY SHOWS 
THAT HE INTENDED TO BIND HIMSELF 
PERSONALLY. 
As indicated above, and in appellant's brief, the only 
question before this Court is whether as a matter of law 
the guarantee executed by Eddington bound him personally 
to pay for produce which Clyde subsequently sold and de-
livered to the Company in reliance on said guarantee. It is 
elemental horn book law that in construing such an agree-
ment, the intention of the parties as manifested by the in-
strument itself is the controlling factor in determining 
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5 
whether the obligation is that of the corporation or is an 
individual obligation of the person who makes it. Where 
the intent is clear and unambiguous, as in the instant case, 
resort cannot be made to parol evidence to alter that intent. 
The language in the instrument clearly shows that 
Eddington intended to bind himself personally to pay for 
any produce delivered by Clyde to the Company. If he did 
not so intend, the language is such as to cause anyone read-
ing the instrument to believe that this was his intent. This 
is especially true in the instant case in view of the fact that 
the letter was furnished to Clyde after he had refused to 
enter into agreements to sell produce to the Company until 
and unless he received a letter from Eddington personally 
guaranteeing payment. 
The letter begins "Dear Bill:" Eddington then states 
"This is to certify that I, personally will guarantee you pay-
ment * * *" It is impossible to state more clearly an 
intent to be bound personally. The personal pronoun "I" 
is certainly not a term normally used in making reference to 
a corporate body. That it was not so intended is empha-
sized in the instant case by the fact that the pronoun "I" 
is followed by the adjective "personally." This is a term 
very commonly used to distinguish an individual from a 
corporate body. It would seem that under no stretch of the 
imagination would the use of the two words together indi-
cate anything other than the fact that Eddington personally 
guaranteed payment. It is also significant that when Ed-
dington makes reference to the delivery of the produce he 
states that "* * * I, personally, will guarantee you 
payment for any tomatoes you raise and deliver for us, 
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* * * " By using the pronoun "us" he makes reference 
to the corporation and himself as distinguished from "I per-
sonally" who makes the guarantee. 
To adopt the appellant's contention that the writing 
was the guarantee of the corporation and not of Eddington 
personally would render the writing meaningless. It would 
be unreasonable to construe the guarantee as being intended 
to make the Company a guarantor of its own debt. The 
natural import of the language used evinces an intention 
to assume personal liability as a guarantor and there is 
nothing to show an intention to make the corporation its 
own guarantor. See J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Clark, 87 S. 
C. 199, 69 S. E. 227. A guarantee is by its very definition 
a promise to pay the debt of another, not a promise to pay 
one's own debt. 
Respondent submits that the language of the guarantee 
is clear and unambiguous and that there can be no question 
but that Eddington intended to be bound personally. 
POINT II 
EDDINGTON'S PERSONAL LIABILITY IS NOT 
CHANGED BECAUSE OF THE FORM OF SIG-
NATURE ON THE GUARANTEE. 
The appellant contends that Eddington is not personally 
liable because the name of the Company appears before 
Eddington's signature. Four cases are cited as authority 
for this proposition; Bankers' Trust Company, et al. v. 
Dockham, et al., 279 Mass. 199, 181 N. E. 174; Anderson 
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v. Davis, 34 Tenn. App. 116, 234 S. W. 2d 368; New England 
Electric Company v. Shook, 27 Colo. App. 30, 145 Pac. 1002 
and St. Joseph Valley Bank v. Napoleon Motors Company, 
et al., 230 Mich. 498, 202 N. W. 933. In all of these cases, 
the court looked to the form of the signature as one of the 
factors to be used in determining whether the person was 
signing in a representative capacity or individually. The 
signatures on the documents in question in these cases in 
the order in which the cases are named above were as fol-
lows: 
(a) "Dockham Publishing Company 
By Steven Dockham, Pres. 
Lillian M. Dockham, Treas." 
(b) "Central Coal Company 
By E. J. Davis, President" 
(c) "The Akron Gas & Electric Co., 
R. A. Shook, President. 
H. C. Black, Secretary." 
(With corporate seal affixed.) 
(d) "Napoleon Motors Co., Frank Trude, Vice-
President, W. G. Rath, Secretary." 
Each of the signatures clearly showed that the person 
signing was acting only in a representative capacity and not 
individually. In all of the cases the signature is followed 
by the title or office of the person signing. In two of the 
cases the name of the corporation is followed by the word 
"By." In at least one of the cases the corporate seal was 
affixed to the document in question. The courts relied on 
these factors in deciding that the instruments did not per-
sonally bind those who executed them. 
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In the instant case there is nothing in the form of sig-
nature or any other part of the instrument which indicates 
an intent to sign in a representative capacity. None of the 
elements relied on by the courts in the cases cited. by appel-
lant to show such intent are present here. If Eddington's 
signature had been preceded by the word "By" or followed 
by "President" there may have been some ambiguity but 
this is not the case. 
Appellant cites no cases and we have found none where 
an individual is relieved of personal responsibility under 
an instrument similar to the one in question. On the other 
hand, there are a number of courts that have considered 
similar guarantees that have held the person executing the 
instrument personally liable. The case of Main Red Granite 
Co. v. York, 89 Me. 54, 35 Atl. 1014, is very similar to the 
instant case. There, the plaintiff had refused to deliver 
coal to the Machiasport Company unless it obtained a per-
sonal guarantee from the defendant. The defendant de-
livered the following letter to plaintiff's manager: 
" 'Dear Sir: Mr. Pattengall advises me that he 
is in need of about $200 worth of Red Beach stock. 
Kindly fill such orders as he may give you, and I 
will attend to the payment of same as they become 
due. Geo. W. York, Treas. of the Machiasport Gran-
ite Company.'" 
The Machiasport Company failed to pay and plaintiff 
brought action to recover from the defendant. The defen-
dant urged as a defense that the letter was not intended to 
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bind him personally. The court in holding for the plaintiff 
stated: 
"* * * In Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 115, 
Judge Story said that guaranties are of extensive 
use in the commercial world, upon the faith of which 
large advances are made and credits given, and care 
should be taken to hold the party bound to the full 
extent of what appears to be his engagement. And 
again, in Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426, the 
same learned judge said: 'We have no difficulty 
whatever in saying that instruments of this sort 
ought to receive a liberal interpretation. By a liberal 
interpretation we do not mean that the words should 
be forced out of their natural meaning, but simply 
that the words should receive a fair and reasonable 
interpretation, so as to attain the object for which 
the instrument is designed, and the purposes to which 
it is applied. We should never forget that letters of 
guaranty are commercial instruments, generally 
drawn up by merchants in brief language, sometimes 
inartificial, and often loose in their structure and 
aim ; and to construe the words of such instruments 
with a nice and technical care would not only defeat 
the intention of the parties, but render them too un-
safe a basis to rely on for extensive credits, so often 
sought in the present active business of commerce 
throughout the world. * * * If the language 
used be ambiguous, and admits of two fair interpre-
tations, and the guarantee has advanced his money 
upon the faith of the interpretation most favorable 
to his rights, that interpretation will prevail in his 
favor; for it does not lie in the mouth of the guaran-
tor to say that he may, without peril, scatter ambig-
uous words, by which the other party is misled to 
his injury.' " 
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In Gavazza v. Plummer, 53 Wash. 14, 101 Pac. 370, the 
court held the defendant personally liable under an instru-
ment that provided: 
"'Spokane, Wash., May 3, 1906, I, W. H. Plum-
mer, treasurer of the Spokane Showcase & Cabinet 
Company, do hereby agree with Mr. N. Gavazza that, 
in consideration of the subscription for five hundred 
(500) shares of the capital stock of the Spokane 
Showcase & Cabinet Company, I will, upon demand, 
accept a return of his stock and refund to him the 
money he has paid therefor, as follows: Two hun-
dred and fifty dollars ( $250) within one year, and 
two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) within eighteen 
( 18) months after he shall exercise his option to 
return said stock. Notice of which shall be mailed 
in writing delivered to me. W. H. Plummer, Treas.' " 
In so holding the court said : 
" 'It is too well settled to need any reference to 
authorities to show that an agent may be the form 
of the promise and manner of his signature fix upon 
himself a personal liability.' Haverhill Mutual Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Newhall, 1 Allen (Mass.) 130. The ap--
pellant has brought himself within this rule. The 
words of his undertaking, 'I will, upon demand, ac-
cept a return of his stock and refund to him the 
money he has paid,' would seem to indicate, irre-
spective of the application of the rule, that it was 
his purpose and intention to become personally 
bound, at least to lead respondent to infer (as re-
spondent testified) that the obligation was personal. 
The addition of 'Treas.' to his signature neither adds 
to nor detracts from that obligation. It is simply, as 
the courts say, 'descriptio personae.' If it is desired 
to escape personal liability in the contract of an 
agent or other representative, the intention so to do 
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must be expressed in clear and explicit language; 
otherwise a personal obligation arises. * * *" 
Also see the following cases where persons executing various 
instruments were held personally liable under signatures as 
indicated: Schwab v. Getty, 145 Wash. 66, 258 Pac. 1035 
"Yakima Shoe Co. 
Geo. A. Getty, Pres. 
P. S. Summers, Sec." 
Way v. Lyric Theater Co., 79 Wash. 275, 1-10 Pac. 320 




G. H. Mueller." 
and Moore v. Webster, 191 Wash. 394, 71 P. 2d 369 
"Charleston Super Service Inc. 
Avis Webster." 
In Murphy v. Reimann Furniture Company, 183 Ore. 
474, 193 P. 2d 1000, the plaintiff brought an action on a 
promissory note signed : 
"Reimann Furniture Mfg. Co. 
Rich L. Reimann 
L. D. Reimann." 
Rich L. Reimann was president and L. D. Reimann was 
secretary-treasurer of the corporation. A default judgment 
was entered against the corporation. The two Reimanns 
claimed as an affirmative defense that the instrument was 
signed solely to cover an indebtedness of the corporation 
and that they signed in a representative capacity and had 
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not intended to bind themselves personally. The Oregon 
Supreme Court refused to allow defendants to introduce evi-
dence to show that they had not intended to bind themselves 
personally holding that the instrument was unambiguous 
and stating : 
"'Any other rule would destroy the stability of 
written contracts. There is no language in the note 
which raises even a slight ambiguity or creates any 
doubt as to the meaning of the instrument, or that re-
motely suggests that the makers were acting for 
another.'" 
We have found no Utah cases that are exactly in point, 
but, in Starley v. Deseret Foods Corporation, 93 Utah 577, 
74 P. 2d 1221, the Utah Supreme Court held that where 
Grant Morgan, secretary of Deseret Foods, executed a note 
as follows: 
"Deseret Foods Corp. 
By Chas. N. Fehr, Pres. 
Grant Morgan." 
there was no ambiguity and Morgan was held personally 
liable even though he claimed that he intended to sign only 
in a representative capacity. 
It is submitted that there is no legal authority to sup-
port appellant's contention that because the name of the 
Company appears before Eddington's signature he is re-
lieved of personal responsibility where the guarantee shows 
clearly and unambiguously that he intended to be bound 
personally. 
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POINT III 
EDDINGTON CANNOT RESORT TO PAROL 
EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT HIS INTENT 
WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT MANIFESTED 
BY THE WRITTEN INSTRUMENT. 
Appellant states in his affidavit that in executing the 
guarantee he intended to bind only the assets of the Com-
pany and did not intend to give a personal guarantee (R. 
39). The law has long been settled that where the language 
in a written instrument is clear and unambiguous, as in the 
instant case, resort cannot be made to parol evidence to 
alter its terms. Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 P. 2d 
449, 20 Am. Jur. 958, Evidence § 1099. Although appellant 
may have had some other intent, he is bound by his. intent 
as manifested by the written instrument. 
CONCLUSION 
The guarantee executed by Eddington is clear and 
unambiguous and binds him personally as a matter of law. 
No genuine issue exists as to any material fact and the Trial 
Court acted properly in granting respondent's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
STERLING D. COLTON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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